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by Tom Painter
On April 28, 2000, the U.S. Justice Department and 17 states
asked a federal judge to direct that the Microsoft Corporation be divided
into two companies. Wow. Split Microsoft in two. It does sound radical,
doesn't it? However, in asking that Microsoft be split up, the plaintiffs
said, "unless effectively remedied Microsoft's actions threaten an
enormous toll on competition and innovation".
Naturally, Microsoft opposes the idea, and lobbies congress
and the public for support. In a full page New York Times advertisement,
on May 1, 2000, top Microsoft officers, Bill Gates (Chairman) and Steve
Balmer (CEO), said: "We believe the government's extreme regulations
would be a major setback for consumers, the high technology industry and
the American economy".
So what's this all about?
Two years ago, the U.S. Justice Department and 19 states filed an antitrust
lawsuit against Microsoft. That was a collective result of years of investigations
and litigation. The lawsuit was filed with federal judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson, who has presided over the Microsoft cases since June 1995. The
claim of the suit is that Microsoft "has engaged in a broad pattern
of unlawful conduct with the purpose and effect of thwarting emerging
threats to its powerful and well-entrenched operating system monopoly"
(Windows). Microsoft tried, with it's own witnesses and experts, to
counter the plaintiffs' claims. After all the evidence, testimony and
arguments, Judge Jackson issued a ruling on November 5, 1999, which essentially
agreed with the plaintiffs. He then appointed Judge Richard Posner, of
the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago to mediate a settlement. Judge Posner
was considered by many as one who could do that job with the least prejudice
toward either side. Five months later, Judge Posner said his efforts had
failed and on April 3rd Judge Jackson ruled that Microsoft was in violation
of U.S. antitrust laws and asked the plaintiffs to propose remedies.
Three weeks later, the Justice Department and 17 states gave Judge Jackson
their remedy proposal (two of the original 19 states declined to sign
it). The division of Microsoft they requested would carve out one company
to produce and market Microsoft's operating systems, like Windows and
Microsoft NT, while a separate company would own the rest of Microsoft's
operations, including the software applications like word processors,
spreadsheets and Internet browsers.
In addition to breaking Microsoft up, the government's remedy would impose
some restrictions on the new Microsoft companies for three years. On May
10, 2000, Microsoft gave Judge Jackson an alternative remedy; outlining
restrictions it would voluntarily impose on itself. Many of those restrictions
are similar to the government's, yet more narrowly focused. Also, the
government's restrictions would require an internal compliance monitoring
process in the two new companies, while Microsoft's would not.
Microsoft complained they did nothing wrong and that the government's
remedy is too restrictive. Bill Gates has said, "Restrictions such
as these would stifle innovation, and make computers less capable and
more expensive". Then Microsoft's proposal agreed to
impose many of the government's restrictions. If Microsoft's conduct was
not wrong to begin with and the restrictions too much of an intrusion
on how they do business, then why not leave it at that and say so.
There are two commonly accepted rumors about Microsoft's legal response
in the case. One is that they will appeal any decision the judge makes.
The other one is that Microsoft wants to delay final judgment until at
least next year, when they hope a new administration might provide a more
favorable situation. With that in mind, either Microsoft's lawyers do
not believe their own case, or their remedy proposal is simply an insincere
offer to Judge Jackson, who wants to conclude the remedy phase by the
end of May 2000.
Does Microsoft have a Monopoly? There is not much question that a de-facto
monopoly exists. Industry data cited in the case indicate Microsoft Windows
is on 90% to 95% of all Intel-compatible personal computers, and nearly
85% of all personal computers. According to many economists, either of
those percentages would constitute a monopoly by most standards.
If there is a monopoly, did Microsoft create it? The lawsuit never claimed
that Microsoft created a monopoly, only that a de-facto monopoly exists.
There were enough mistakes by IBM, Apple, Unix and others that contributed
to Microsoft's success. Apple had its niche, wouldn't move out of it and
often sold at a premium over Intel-compatible machines. IBM lacked the
will and the vision, and Unix stayed in the technical background letting
Microsoft flourish. Was that Microsoft's fault? - No, not by a long shot.
The more argumentative part of the story involves the question: If the
Windows operating system constitutes a monopoly, did Microsoft behave
illegally? After Windows became a de-facto monopoly, how was Microsoft's
success built? Did their success come simply out of an ability to produce
new, unique, creative and innovative software, better than anyone else,
as Microsoft wants to claim?
In their May 1 advertisement, Bill Gates and Steve Balmer said, in reference
to the achievements of the high-tech industries: "Continued healthy
competition, innovation and consumer choice - not government intervention
- are the most effective tools to ensure these benefits will continue
for years to come".
In the Justice Department's report titled 'Plaintiffs Joint Proposed
Finding of Fact', September 10, 1999, in a reference to Microsoft's view
of Netscape Navigator, a Microsoft executive is quoted, saying: "we
were very concerned that if the user saw Netscape Navigator side by side
with Internet Explorer
we would lose." Clearly Netscape
had jumped ahead of Microsoft and together with other Internet related
technologies posed a competitive challenge to Windows' dominance. How
did Microsoft respond to that threat?
Microsoft actions in response to Netscape and other previous competing
innovations, are detailed in the lawsuit and challenge the "benign dominance"
view which Microsoft projects for itself. While Microsoft has many successes
to be proud of, the view presented by the antitrust case is that Microsoft's
conduct often does not promote healthy competition, innovation and
consumer choice. Where is the once healthy competition for Windows
applications for file compression, word-processing, spreadsheets, desktop
publishing, presentations, and most recently Internet browsers, just to
name a few? Some might call it just sour grapes, but The Computer &
Communications Industry Association (CCIA) and the Software and Information
Industry Association (SIIA), two highly respected industry trade groups,
filed friend of the court briefs supporting the government's remedy in
the antitrust case. Microsoft was a member of the SIIA until the other
members favored supporting the government's case.
The software industry is littered with remnants and more than a few carcasses,
of companies that tried to compete head-on with Microsoft and lost. Did
they always lose because their software was inferior, or because their
products were less than what consumers wanted? No. They sometimes lost
because of how Microsoft used its monopoly to manipulate whose products
got to the Windows desktop and how they got there. Judge Jackson's rulings
have repeatedly found that Microsoft's conduct violates U.S. antitrust
laws.
Will our high-tech revolution whither if Microsoft is divided up?
Some recent Microsoft statements about the lawsuit are reminiscent of
a phrase that was once used in reference to General Motors, at a time
when it had maybe 60% or more of the U.S. automobile market. That phrase
went something like "If it's good for General Motors, it's good for America".
Bill Gates speaks of Microsoft allot like that lately. He has said, "The
dismantling of Microsoft also would send a signal that companies in America
that are too successful will be punished harshly - a signal that will
be welcomed by foreign competitors seeking to overtake America's global
leadership in technology". In spite of those words from Mr. Gates,
those sentiments were untrue about General Motors in the past, and are
equally false about Microsoft today.
If success and dominance alone were the features that brought the suit
against Microsoft, then why didn't the government try to break up the
Intel Corporation? If Windows is on 85% of the worlds personal computers,
and every Windows PC is an Intel-compatible PC, and most of those PC's
use Intel's computer chips then isn't Intel a de-facto monopoly and shouldn't
they be broken up? The answer is no and the reason is because the real
issue is not simply a matter of dominating success - it is how the dominant
player operates in meeting the challenge of healthy competition. Intel
has been both an industry team leader and an industry team player. Microsoft
is seldom willing to take a role that is less than at least co-captain.
Microsoft markets the idea that it is being punished simply because it
is successful, and the public is lulled into to not looking behind the
scenes for the basis of some of that success. Meanwhile, it is not "foreign
competitors" against "Americas global leadership" that
Microsoft is really concerned about. The American economy hosts
the largest contingent of competitors and entrepreneurs across every facet
of the high-tech industry. Those are the competitors Microsoft worries
about.
Microsoft's public relations campaign on the antitrust issue attempts
to wrap the fate of the country in with it's own fate. And, with Windows
on the vast majority of PCs, it's easy to see how that campaign makes
people feel their technological security depends on Microsoft. Yet, that
campaign also helps demonstrate one of the foundations of Microsoft's
success: which is, that in many ways greater than their technological
prowess, they have been great at marketing themselves and their products.
That is maybe their best asset.
So, Bill Gates runs around the country sounding a lot like a character
in an old children's' story. That character is 'Chicken Little' and in
the story something falls on his head and he runs around yelling, "the
sky is falling, the sky is falling". Yes, the government wants to
hit Microsoft on the head pretty hard. However, even if the government's
remedy is implemented in full, there are plenty of expert arguments that
say the increased competition and innovations from that breakup will be
greater than the disruptions it may cause. Chicken Little's friends learned
he was paranoid about the sky falling; we don't need to let Mr. Gates
get us paranoid about our technological futures.
If Microsoft is broken up will shareholders be damaged in the long run?
Microsoft could become like AT&T, where the sum of the parts is greater
than the whole. In a New York Times article dated April 29: Garth Saloner,
an economist at Stanford University, is quoted saying, "This is the most
conservative of the structural split-ups" that the government looked at.
In that same article, two investment industry advisers, Robert F. Greenhill
and Jeffrey P. Williams, are reported writing that the government proposal
"will not result in a material decrease in market value over the intermediate
to long term". Many industry analysts accept those views.
If a legal remedy is necessary, is the Justice Department's the right
one? Some experts in management theory believe that a regulatory regime
is a less disruptive measure for enforcing restrictions on a monopoly,
than breaking it up. They fear the disruption of internal teams will spill
over into current and future developments with a monopoly's business partners.
Some of those developments may be in cutting edge technology that some
companies are depending on for their business plans. Some would site disruptions
in the internal dynamics at AT&T, when it was split up, as examples
of conditions that delayed the public introduction of new technology that
was on its way to production.
Many commentaries on the issue ignore the fact that a regime of restrictions
was placed on Microsoft in 1995, following an earlier lawsuit. And, the
current lawsuit resulted in part from the government's finding that Microsoft
was not living up to earlier agreements. From its history of litigation
with Microsoft, the government argues that the details in the self-imposed
restrictions Microsoft suggests do not provide any assurance Microsoft
will abide by them. The government position also fears that restrictions
alone will not prevent the monopolistic conduct that stifles innovation
and competition.
Paul Romer, another Stanford University economist, has made the most
forceful argument for the government's view that their remedy matches
their goal. He argues that tomorrow's upstart entrepreneurs should
not be discouraged from competing against Microsoft. "This remedy" he
wrote, "will significantly increase the returns that outside innovators
.can
hope to earn if they develop and commercialize new technology like the
browser."
So, there is a body of experts that acknowledge Microsoft's breakup will
cause some disruptions, yet believe new forces of innovation and competition
will also be released. Their view is that the long-term situation will
be better than if the government did nothing.
There is another general view of monopolies. That is, that a monopoly
always carries the seeds of its own undoing. A monopoly restricts innovation
and competition. That produces needs that the monopoly does not meet.
Entrepreneurs step in to exploit those needs. New innovations are created.
Eventually, some new innovation begins to bypass the monopoly. The monopoly's
vulnerability is exposed and more competition is created around those
vulnerabilities.
Whether or not Microsoft is split in two, competitive forces may already
be in play to undo its dominance in the not too distant future. For evidence
of that, you might look at what is going on with the Linux operating system
and Internet server operations, or the Palm digital personal assistant,
or Nokia and AOL porting Instant Messenger into the cell phone or a raft
of new wireless products to take you onto the Internet from a handheld
device and perform everything you now do from your computer - without
Windows.
Is the Justice Department's solution needed now? Even though Microsoft
could be approaching a point in it's life that is similar to IBM's at
the time the government sought to break it up, the antitrust issue is
always one of concern for the harm the monopoly is doing now - how bad
is it? The Justice Department and 17 states feel there is more harm in
not doing something. If Microsoft is restricting too much competition
now and the breakup will unleash innovation and competition with greater
value than what is lost from disruptions, which the breakup may cause,
then yes divide 'er up. If a standard of behavior to expect from the next
potential technology monopolist is needed, and a breakup is less intrusive
than an ongoing regime of regulations, then maybe a breakup will be a
good warning. But didn't the IBM and AT&T cases provide a warning?
Do monopolies pay attention to such warnings?
In the end, no matter what Judge Jackson decides, his decision alone
(even if implemented), will not prevent Microsoft's employees and business
partners from continuing to cooperate in an ongoing high-tech revolution,
nor will America's technological superiority be seriously jeopardized
and consumers will not be saddled with fewer choices and inferior products.
The sky is not going to fall.
Besides, Microsoft has an equal chance of running out the clock on the
antitrust litigation, without any final judgment. In the meantime, there
is no reason to embrace Microsoft more than we already have. Microsoft
makes wonderful software, but its dominance is not benevolence and it
is not our technological messiah.
by Tom Painter
Editorial #22
May 25, 2000
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